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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The defendant asks that the finding of g1'.''.t
be reversed and the complaint dismissed or in the
alternative that the case be remanded for a new tria;,
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

THE STATE OF UTAH
Respondents
vs.
STANLEY WAYNE BARAN

Case No.
21718

Appellant
---0000000---

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
The defendant, Stanley Wayne
Baran, was charged with robbery in violation of title 76, chapter 51, section 1
Utah Code Annotated 1953, charging that
on January 10, 1969, in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, he robbed Corey Sharp and
Rebecca Luras.

Defendant has filed this

Appeal seeking to have the Court dismiss
the charges against this defendant, or
remand the case for a new trial.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER
COURT
The petitioner-defendant was convicted by a jury on September 18, 1969,
of robbery.

Judge Gordon R. Hall heard

the matter.

Defendant was sentenced to

serve six months in Farmington County
Jail, to repay $500.00, and to remain on
probation for two years.

-2-

Approximately

one month of the jail sentence has be 2 n
served.
FACTS
The petitioner-defendant was
jointly charged with robbery in violLltion of 76-51-1 UCA in a complaint before
James S. Sawaya, City Judge of Murray,
alleging that Stanley Wayne Baran and
Brian Frazier, on January 10, 1969 in
Salt Lake County, robbed Corey Sharp and
Rebecca Luras.

Bail of $15,000 was

reduced to $5,000.

Defendant demurred

to the complaint and a preliminary hearing was set for June 30, 1969.

The

demurrer allegin3that the complaint
failed to state a location, time or particulars sufficient to enable defendant
to prepare a defense, was denied.

On

June 30, 1969, the court without hearing
denied an application to change venue and
-3-

denied defendant a reporter.

Testimony

was received and the court on its own
motion continued the case to July 1,
1969.

On that date, further testimony

was taken.

Defendant recorded both days

of testimony.

The case was taken under

advisement to July 2, 1969, on which
date defendant was bound over to stand
trial.

Defendant's arraignment came

before Judge D. Frank Wilkins on July
14, 1969.

A motion to quash was filed

and heard on July 18, 1969, but no
transcript of that hearing was forwarded.
The motion was denied and on July 21,
1969, defendant plead Not Guilty and
filed a demand for speedy trial.

On

July 28, 1969, defendant filed Notice of
Alibi.

The case came on for trial August

18, 1969, and was continued, over
vigorous protest of defendant, as defen-

-4-

dant wanted both trials held one after
the other (Judge Hall heard the first
felony charge which the jury returned a
Not Guilty verdict on.)

The case was

reset September 18, 1970, and trial
commenced that day.

Defendant was pre-

judiced by the delay as he was without
funds, a witness moved and was lost, the
defendant was jailed unduly for a misdemeanor and could not assist in preparation of his defense.

He was kept jailed

and brought to the court in irons before
the jury, and a guard kept present at all
times, before the same judge who lost
the first case.
The defense asked that the court
rule in advance that no reference be made
in the course of the trial to the fact
that defendant had been a police officer
formerly charged, due to the adverse

-5-

€ffect on the jury of extensive adverse
publicity.

The court was asked

not to question the jurors on what they
had read if such evidence were excluded
(T83[10] ).

The court refused to rule

on the former (T 82 [2]) and then
advised the jury Mr. Baran was a police
officer (T 87;20).

Having so advised

them, the court refused to enquire
privately what each had read (T 88;12),
(T 94;1) or if the neighbors knew of
the divorce of defendant with its hard
words (T 96; 1-30).
The defense challenged the jury
panel which consisted of middle aged,
caucasions,

selected at that time from

the tax rolls.

(Note: the court has

since changed the method of selection,
taking them from the voting rolls).
The jury panel consisted of 16 persons
-6-

of whom one lived six houses away frcm
defendant's estranged wife, eight of
whom had been previously robbed, sorne ac:
many as three times, and two of that
eight who had read all about defendant's
other case in the papers.

The court

refused to grant a hearing on the panel.
Three persons who were in these catagories survived the challenges.

One wan-

ted to be excused for business and had
to be challenged when the court would
not, and thus the composition of the
panel ended up with considerable bias
against defendant, as one other had been
on a recent case with the prosecutor, and
1 indicated an affirmative to bias and
was not excused (T 90;13) and the court
cut defense off repeatedly.
( T 94; 9) ,

(TS 7; 21)

(T 93; 4)

( T 81; 11) etc.

-7-

I

Tile State's witnesses testified that on January 10,
19G9, at 10 P. M., 2 persons, one of whom was
C..:. ztld Rose, came into a service station at 11th

1=;.i st and 17th South in Salt Lake County and took

with gun and cro\vbar cash receipts of about $300
to $550 and $2 from a wallet.

Mr. Harwood saw

2 n1en enter and scoop money up and another pick
t 1-:ie:rn

up in a 196 3 Ford and followed until he was

fired upon.

{Exhibit 4)

None of them identified

defendant as being there.

Mr. Lewis had his car

stolen from Trailways Bus Depot at 9:10 P.M. and
recovered it later with a stolen transistor and hole
shot in the rear window.

The prosecutor then put

in evidence of a burgulary not related to this offense
(T 132;17) and the court refused a mistrial {Tl33:6).
Mr. Lewis testified defendant worked one day at
this station 2 weeks before the robbery and the
Judge refused to instruct on stricken evidence on
cash register operations.

-8-

Clare Rose then testified that at 11 P. M.

on

January 10, 1969, Gerald, Frazier, and defendant were at her home, defendant handed Gerry
money and said

11

You 1 re in it.

11

and threatened

her life and that of her children.

The Court re-

fused to allow a recording of prior testimony to
impeach, alledging poor quality, although the
recording is clear enough.

Police Officer Paul

Rogers testified that on January 10, 1969 at llP.!-.1.

i

Stan Baran was with him at the Police Station
(T 299:19).

Evidence of items taken in the robbery

and found at the Rose home was stipulated. (Exhibit!

1, 2, and 3.)
The only testimony linking defendant to the
robbery came from a 2-time convicted felon,
Gerald Rose who was identified by witnesses at
the crime and granted immunity from 2 new felonie:

for implicating a policeman whom he did not like.

-9-

The prosecution withheld evidence of the
from the jury (T 188: 15).

He

placed Defendant and another person against
whom the prosecutor elected not to proceed
after he denied being in the robbery and
produced an

(T 282:30)

Rose testi-

fied that at 7 P.M. he picked both up on
south Temple and they took an hour to drive
for gas at North Beck Street (T 211:25) at
8 P.M. and while looking for a car to steal
went to three

(3) places to steal

waiting

at a cafe at 9 P.M. and then over 1/2 hour
waiting thereafter at a theatre; and on
(T 217:25) dropped Rose's car off at 9; and
at 9:10 the car of Mr. Lewis' was stolen.
Defendant and four witnesses testified as to
his alibi and the jury chose not to believe
them or the supposed co-defendant Frazier
and his alibi.
-10-

The prosecutor was then allowed to place a.i
exotic dancer on the stand who said Defendant sp 0 ;,
of knowing something of the case, but Prosecuti'in
withheld from Defendant and the jury a recorded con1,
I
I

sation whereby Defendant communicated his suspicioj
of Rose to the police before his arrest.
for new trial.)

-11-

(See motion

I

STATEMENT OF POINTS AND ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE ONLY EVIDENCE CONNECTING DEFENDANT TO THE ROBBERY WAS A STATEMENT
OF AN ACCOMPLICE WHICH STATEMENT WAS
NOT CORROBORATED.
STATUTORY REQUIREMENT
The law in Utah is very clear with
regards to the requirement that a defendant not be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.

A law

has been on the books since Utah's territorial days which clearly states this
requirement.

In its present form it reads:

CONVICTION ON TESTIMONY OF ACCOMPLIC: - A conviction shall not be
had on the testimony of an accomplice unless he is corroborated by
other evidence which in itself and
without the aid of the testimony
of the accomplice tends to connect
the defendant with the committing
of the offence; and the corroboration shall not be sufficient, if
it merely shows the commission of
-12-

the offence or the circumstances
therE:of.
77-31-18 UCA ( 1953)
DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW
Despite the clarity of the statute,
a great body of case law has developed in
Utah and other states with regards to the
exact requirements of corroboration in
such matters.

In an effort to aid Utah

courts in determining what is sufficient
corroboration, the Utah Supreme Court has
adopted some tests which, although they
have originated in other courts, have
been used over the years as guidelines in
Utah.

In 1931, the Utah Supreme Court

described both of these tests:
"The corroborative evidence need
not be sufficient in itself to
sustain a conviction but it must
in and of itself tend to implicate and connect the accused with
the commission of the crime charged
and not be consistent with his
innocence.
It is insufficient if
it merely casts a grave suspicion

-13-

on the accused." State vs.
Laris 78 Utah 183, 2 P.2d. 243
( 1931)
In this same case, the Court adopLcd
another test, citing with approval the
test used in Welden vs. State, 10 Tex.
App. 400:"Eliminate from the case the evidence of the accomplice, and then
examine the evidence of the other
witnesses with the view to ascertain if there be inculpatory
evidence - evidence tending to
connect the defendant with the
offence.
If there is, the accomplice is corroborated; if there is
no inculpatory evidence, there is
not corroboration, though it may
be corroborated in regard to any
number of facts sworn to by him."
ID
In a further effort to clarify this
area of law, various Supreme Court decisions have added additional explanatory
matter.

For example, in 1927 the Supreme

Court in Utah held that:"The corroborative evidence required
-14-

by the statute need not be sufficient in itself to support a conviction but it must implicate the
accused in the offence and not be consistent with his innocence.
It is insufficient if it merely casts a grave
suspicion on the accused." State v.
Lay, 38 Utah 143, 10 Pac. 987
(Emphasis added).
In California it was held that the corroborative evidence was not sufficient if it
required further interpretation and direction
to give it value.

People v. Brady 382 P.

2d. 591, 59C. 2d. 855, 51 Cal. Rptr. 471,
96 ALR 2nd 1178.
As noted previously, despite apparent
clarity of the statute involved, a great body
of case law has developed, touching on the
requirement of corroborative testimony.

The

problem in most cases seems to be whether
the alleged corroborative testimony was sufficient.

The defendant in most cases contends

that there was no corroborative evidence at
all or if there was any such corroborative

-15-

evidence, was insufficient.

A Utah case

held that:"While it is a question for the
jury to determine whether the
corroborative evidence is sufficient, in connection with the
testimony of the accomplice to
justify conviction, yet unless
there is corroborative evidence
of the material fact tending to
connect the defendant with the
commission of the crime, the
court should direct the verdict
for the defendant." State v.
Somers 97 Utah 132, 90P. 2d.
273 {1939).
In many cases, the prosecutor has
attempted to corroborate the testimony of
the accomplice and has, in fact, corroborated his testimony with regard to much of
the accomplice's story.

However, as poin- ,

ted out in State vs. Somers, supra, the
corroborative evidence must be of a material fact, an element of the crime.

It must '

tend to connect the defendant with the
corrunission of the crime and not merely
corroborate certain points of the accom-

--16-

olice's story.
As pointed out in the State vs.
Laras, supra, the corroborative evidence
must tend to implicate the defendant with
the crime charged, not merely some criminal act or some suspicious behaviour.

As

the Court said, it is insufficient if the
corroborative evidence merely casts a
grdve suspicion on the accused.

The

courts have required that this corroborative evidence actually connect the accused
with the crime in question.

It is not

sufficient if the evidence relates to
some other criminal act or even an apparently similar criminal act, but it must
relate to the crime in question, the crime
charged.

Repeating again the second test

cited by the court in State v. Laras, the
corroborative evidence should be looked
at completely apart from the testimony
-17--

of the accomplice, and the connection
with the defendant to the crime charged
must be solely on the basis of this corroborative evidence.

If the defendant's

action, in light of the alleged corroborative testimony can be seen to be consistent with his innocence, the courts
have held that this corroborative evidence
is not sufficient and have required a
directed verdict in favor of him.
INSUFFICIENT CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE
In State v. Butterfield, cited
supra, the alleged corroborative evidence
was the finding of stolen property in
the defendant's house.

However, because

the defendant's brother was also charged
with the crime, and since the court
assumed that they both lived in the same
house, the finding of the stolen property
was consistent with the defendant's inno-1&-

cence and was not sufficient to convict
him

the crime.

State v. Somers, cited supra:
"While it has been held that this
corroborative evidence may be
slight *** and may be established
by circumstantial other than
direct evidence ***, yet the evidence must do more than create a
mere suspicion as to the defendant's
guilt ..
It must tend to connect
the defendant with the commission
of the offence *** and it is not
sufficient corroboration to establish a motive merely." ID at 274.
In this arson case, the evidence
showed that the defendant was with the
accomplice:
"On the evening in question at or
near the time the fire started,
and in the vicinity of the building.
In the present case, this
evidence is entirely consistent
with the defendant's innocence
*** Somers does not deny he was
with Elgin (the accomplice) on the
evening of the alleged arson, in
fact, he admits that the two were
together for some time during the
evening, but his story which is
corroborated by other witnesses,
is that he left Elgin at about
9:30 p.m. and went up town, where
he was with others some time before
the fire alarm sounded: State v.
;.19-

Somers 90 Pac. 2nd at 274.
The Court here held that evidence
of highly suspicious activity on the part
of the defendant, together with the testimony of the accomplice, was insufficient
to convict him of the crime.

The same

case notes even further - quoting again
from the case:"Appellant's conduct while he
was in jail in threatening anyone
who might testify against him
might arouse suspicion that he had
had something to do with the fire,
but mere suspicion is not sufficient
to corroborate an accomplice. And
this circumstance is consistent
with the desire to prevent Grames,
who was in jail with him, from
threatened false testimony of the
latter." ID at 274.
In a recent Arizona case, it was
held that there was insufficient corroborative evidence when the testimony showed
that the defendant and two accomplices
left together on the night of the burglary
in question and returned together later
in the same evening.

Further testimony

-20-

,

'Jy a gas station attendant

showed that

the two accomplices who were known to
him, plus a third whom he did not know,
stopped at a station at the night of the
burglary, and additional testimony of
the owner of the burglarized store that
the defendant had previously worked at
the store and was thus familiar with the
layout and operation of the store did
not adequately connect the defendant with
the commission of the crime and were
insufficient to corroborate the testimony
of the two accomplices.

State v. Gold-

thorpe 96 Ariz. 350, 395 P. 2nd 708 (1964)
Mere suspicion was not enough in
the 1968 Utah case where the Sheriff's
testimony tended to establish that footprints found near the scene of the crime
had pointed toes and subsequent testimony
of an accomplice that the defendant had

-21-

been wearing shoes with pointed
These facts were not found sufficient
to corroborate the testimony of an
accomplice.

State v. Olsen 21 Utah

2nd 128, 441 P. 2nd 707 (1968).
An Oklahoma case held that evidence
sufficient to merely show the commission
of the crime was insufficient corroboration.

Rodrigues v. State, Okla. 406

P. 2nd. 506.
In California it was held that
evidence showing the opportunity of the
defendant to conunit the offence was not
sufficient evidence to corroborate the
testimony of an accomplice.

People v.

Thurmond, 170 C.A. 2nd 121, 338 P. 2nd
472.
SUFFICIENT CORROBORATIVE
EVIDENCE
It will be helpful to examine
several examples of what was sufficient
-22-

evidence to corroborate the testimony
of an accomplice.

The finding of stolen

goods on the defendant's property has
generally held to be sufficient corroborative evidence.

In State v. Vigil,

123 Utah 495, 260 P. 2nd 539 (1953) the
defendant's testimony had been that a
certain suitcase was his.

The suitcase

was later proved to have been stolen.
This evidence was sufficient corroboration to the testimony of an accomplice.
In a 1942 case, State v. Erwin, 101 Utah
365, 120 P. 2nd 285 (1942) in which the
Mayor of Salt Lake and several city
officials were charged with conspiracy
to accept a bribe, the Utah Supreme Court
held that corroborative evidence may
consist in the admissions of the accused.
In State v. Bruner, 106 Utah 49,
146 P. 2nd. 302 (1944) the finding of

stolen goods on defendant was held to
be sufficient corroborative evidence
even though the defendant testified that
he merely recovered the goods for the
purpose of returning them to the owner.
In a 1963 Utah case, it was held
that the defendant's admission of being
in the area of the crime, the finding
of a shotgun and nylon stocking allegedly
worn on the head of the defendant and
his accomplice along the route, together
with independent testimony by a witness
in another state that the defendant had
admitted to him that he shot a man in
Utah, under identical circumstances,
were held to be sufficient corroboration
to the testimony of an accomplice.
State v. Cazda, 14 Utah 2nd 266, 382 P.
2nd 407 (1963).
In State v. Simpson, 120 Utah 596,

-24--

236 P. 2nd 1077 (1951) the defendant
was convicted on testimony of an accomplice which was corroborated by evidence
of flight and attempted concealment from
a police officer, as well as attempts
to sell the stolen merchandise.
EXAMPLES FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS
To recite the various fact situations discussed by the courts of other
jurisdictions would take several volumes.
However, it will not be out of place to
examine a few of these, since most of
the Western States have basically the
same law as Utah.
In an Oregon case, it was held
that evidence tending to show that the
defendant's automobile was found stuck
in a mud hole next to a stolen safe
and that a set of foot-tracks was found
leading from the defendant's car to a
-2'5-

place where a coin box from the safe was
found, was sufficient corroboration for
the testimony of an accomplice.

State

v. Cheek, 240 Or. 323 41 P. 2nd 27.
In an Alaska case, the evidence
of the defendant's fingerprints found
in the building, was sufficient corroboration for the testimony of an accomplice.
Braham v. State, Alaska, 376 P. 2nd 714.
In Arizona, it was held that
evidence showing flight by the defendant,
his apprehension, as well as possession
of the stolen property, was sufficient
corroborative evidence.

State v. Turner

94 Ariz. 49, 383 P. 2nd 866.

And in

another Arizona case, evidence showing
the fact that the truck of the defendant
was at the scene of the crime as well
as evidence that the defendant had
transported stolen goods, was sufficient

corroboration for the testimony of an
accomplice.

State v. Cope 438 P. 2nd

442 7 Ariz. App. 295.
In California, sufficient corroborative evidence was found in the defendant's admissions to a police officer,
his attempt to make a false alibi, and
his flight from a policeman.

People v.

Santo, 43 C. 2nd 319, 273 P. 2nd 249.
Possession of the probable instrument
of the crime was found to be sufficient
corroborative evidence to warrant conviction on the testimony of an accomplice
in People v. Keen, 128 CA 2nd 520, 275
P. 2nd 804.

And the California Courts

have held that evidence that the defendant knew the value of furs stolen and
that he surreptisiouly sold them at a
lesser price, was sufficient corroborative evidence in People v. Shofstall
56 CA 2nd 121 132 P. 2nd 48.
-C.7-

•

SUMMARY

The law in Utah is clear that
conviction shall not be had on the testimony of an accomplice unless he is
corroborated by other evidence.

Courts

in Utah have enlarged upon this statutory test and have held that the corroborative evidence must connect the accused
with the crime charged; that the corroborative evidence must do more than create
a mere suspicion as to the guilt of the
defendant.

The corroborative evidence

must be looked at apart from the testimony of the accomplice, and when so looked
at, must not be consistent with the
defendant's innocence.

If the corrobor-

ative testimony does not connect the
defendant with at least some material
element of the crime charged and if it
is consistent with the innocence of the
defendant, Utah courts have required that

direct verdict be granted in favor of the defendant
;i.nd as the evidence in this case did not rise to the
r.:::quired level, it was error not to direct a verdict
for Defendant.
POINT 2
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN PERMITTING PROSECUTION TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR GUILTY
FIN DING IN A MISDEMEANOR CASE AND OF OTHER
CRIMES.
It is a well established rule that in a criminal

prosecution proof which shows or tends to show that
the accused is guilty of the commission of other
crimes at other times is incompetent and inadmissable for the purpose of showing the commission of
the crime charged (29 Am Jur 2d 366; Evidence, Sec.
320, and cases cited therein.)
The cited text states the philosophy to be
prevention of a conviction by inference that one who
c ommitts other crimes is likely to have committed
that charged.

This rule has been adopted in Utah.
-29-

(People v. Couglin, 13 Utah 58, 44 P. 94; State
v. Gillies, 40 Utah 541, 123 P. 93; State v. Bowe.:,
I

43 Utah 111, 134 P. 623; State v. Mc Gowen, 66 Utah I
223, 241 P. 314; State v. Gregarious, 81 Utah 33,
16 P. 2d 893; State v. Anderton, 81 Utah 320, 17
P. 2d 917;
20;

State v. Peterson, 83 Utah 74, 27 P.ZG:

State v. Kappes, 100 Utah 274, 114 P.2d 20J;

State v. Nemier, 106 Utah 307, 148 P.2d 327; and
State v. McHenry, 7 Utah 2d 289, 323 P. 2d 710).
There are exceptions to show a general scheme
where one involves proving the other, to establish
identity, to prove constitutive elements of the crime
on trial, none of which are material here.
The crimes elicited by prosecution include I
dismissal as an officer on a prior charge

resulting

in a conviction of destruction of property a misdemeanor, theft of a radio, taking of pennies, conspiring to rob a theatre and a cafe, stealing a car,
etc •.
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DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR AND
TIAL TRIAL.
An accused is guaranteed a fair and impar-

tial trial by the Constitution of Utah (Art. I, Sec. 12). ·
To convict him otherwise is a violation of that constitutional right.
Defendant points to the following character istics:

1. The Court assisted in prosecution of the
case where no assistance was needed by advising the
jury that Defendant was a discharged police officer,
making the motion to exclude defense witnesses, inad8quate questioning of the jury, failure to remand
for preliminary hearing, failure to try the case when
originally set, holding defendant in jail during and
before the trial thus making him unable to assist
in his defense and making him impecunious, and
then had him brought to court in handcuffs, failure
to require the State to identify its witnesses even
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on the day of trial, failure to try the jury panel
question, failure to dismiss jurors challenged,
failure to instruct the jury of defendants prP"'U!llr.
tion of innocence at the outs et of the trial, permitted
prosecution to lead witnesses and make speeches
to the jury and cut defense off, allowed prosecution
to cross examine its own witness Harwood, refused
to assist in securing the presence of a police officer
for rebuttal the last day of trial, hurried the conclusion of the case and arguments, and refused a
continuance to get 2 witnesses in order to
ball game.

get to a

The Court failed to grant a mistrial for

non-related crime evidence, refused to permit a
recording of preliminary hearing testimony to be
played to the jury, refused to admit the repair slip
on defendant's car, refused a retrial and to sign a
certificate of probable cause, and required Mr.
Holloway to produce in court evidence to substantiate his testimony and required defense to recall
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1

him and refused to instruct as requested.
Hardly any one of these errors alone
'iC

nld justify a new trial, but taken together and

with the Court's repremanding of defense counsel
and defense witnesses, the jury could not help but
have been influenced and prejudiced against defendant; and it is reasonably probable that a result
more favorable to defendant would have been reached
in the absence of the error complained of. Pacific
Digest, Criminal Law, Key 1162; People v. Wardell,
334 P. Zd 641, 167 C. A. Zd 560 (1959).

POINT

4

THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN ITS SELECTION, VOIR DIRE, AND
INSTRUCTION OF THE JURY.
As may be observed in the statement of
fact and transcript the Court failed to try the jury
panel question as required by the Utah Law.

The

jury was not a representative group as 8 of them
had been robbed, one was a neighbor of defendant's
-33-

estranged wife, 2 of them had read all about defendant' s prior case and possibly this one and one expressed a bias and another wanted to get back to liis
business.
The Court refused to inquire privately of
the jury as to their knowledge.

The law does not set

out such a procedure nor deny such a right to defendant.
The jury was not advised (according to the
record) of defendant's presumption of innocence at
the outset of the case.
The instruction on an accomplice's testimony does not set out tests by which a jury could
be expected to judge whether there is corroboration
as would defendant's requested instruction.
CONCLUSION
The defendant submits that the Supreme
Court should reverse the conviction of guilty and
dismiss the complaint as there is no evidence to
link him to the crime of Gerald Rose except Gerald
Rose.
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In the alternative defendant feels strongly
ei'ough in his innocence and that the errors of the
trial denied him a fair trial, that he is willing to
risk 5 to 20 years in prison against his 6 month
sentence for another trial.

Respectfully submitted,

( ' ;(
DON L. BYBEE
1414 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for
Defendant-Appellant

This is to stipulate that Defendant delivered

a

2 copies of the above brief to the Attorney General on

April 30, 1970, and that Defendant may file said brief
\

I'

•

u

Ji day. after the final dah with out prejudice,'),

a {{

.i \.; \
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•!For Vernon Romney
Attorney General
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